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Abstract
Privacy concern has been increasingly important in many machine learning (ML) problems. We study
empirical risk minimization (ERM) problems under secure multi-party computation (MPC) frameworks.
Main technical tools for MPC have been developed based on cryptography. One of limitations in current
cryptographically private ML is that it is computationally intractable to evaluate non-linear functions
such as logarithmic functions or exponential functions. Therefore, for a class of ERM problems such as
logistic regression in which non-linear function evaluations are required, one can only obtain approximate
solutions. In this paper, we introduce a novel cryptographically private tool called secure approximation
guarantee (SAG) method. The key property of SAG method is that, given an arbitrary approximate
solution, it can provide a non-probabilistic assumption-free bound on the approximation quality under
cryptographically secure computation framework. We demonstrate the benefit of the SAG method by
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applying it to several problems including a practical privacy-preserving data analysis task on genomic
and clinical information.
1 Introduction
Privacy preservation has been increasingly important in many machine learning (ML) tasks. In this paper,
we consider empirical risk minimizations (ERMs) when the data is distributed among multiple parties, and
these parties are unwilling to share their data to other parties. For example, if two parties have different sets
of features for the same group of people, they might want to combine these two datasets for more accurate
predictive model building. On the other hand, due to privacy concerns or legal regulations, these two parties
might want to keep their own data private. The problem of learning from multiple confidential databases
have been studied under the name of secure multi-party computation (secure MPC). This paper is motivated
by our recent secure MPC project on genomic and clinical data. Our task is to develop a model for predicting
the risk of a disease based on genomic and clinical information of potential patients. The difficulty of this
problem is that genomic information were collected in a research institute, while clinical information were
collected in a hospital, and both institutes do not want to share their data to others. However, since the
risk of the disease is dependent both on genomic and clinical features, it is quite valuable to use both types
of information for the risk modeling.
Various tools for secure MPC have been taken from cryptography, and privacy-preserving ML approaches
based on cryptographic techniques have been called cryptographically private ML. A key building block of
cryptographically private ML is homomorphic encryption by which sum or product of two encrypted values
can be evaluated without decryption. Many cryptographically private ML algorithms have been developed,
e.g., for linear regression [1,2] and SVM [3,4] by using homomorphic encryption property. One of limitations
in current cryptographically private ML is that it is computationally intractable to evaluate non-linear
functions such as logarithmic functions or exponential functions in homomorphic encryption framework.
Since non-linear function evaluations are required in many fundamental statistical analyses such as logistic
regression, it is crucially important to develop a method that can alleviate this computational bottleneck.
One way to circumvent this issue is to approximate non-linear functions. For example, in Nardi et al.’s
work [5] for secure logistic regression, the authors proposed to approximate a logistic function by sum of step
functions, which can be computed under secure computation framework.
Due to the very nature of MPC, even after the final solution is obtained, the users are not allowed
to access to private data. When the resulting solution is an approximation, it is important for the users
to be able to check its approximation quality. Unfortunately, most existing cryptographically private ML
method does not have such an approximation guarantee mechanism. Although a probabilistic approximation
guarantee was provided in the aforementioned secure logistic regression study [5], the approximation bound
derived in that work depends on the unknown true solution, meaning that the users cannot make sure how
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much they can trust the approximate solution.
The goal of this paper is to develop a practical method for secure computations of ERM problems. To
this end, we introduce a novel secure computation technique called secure approximation guarantee (SAG)
method. Given an arbitrary approximate solution of an ERM problem, the SAG method provides non-
probabilistic assumption-free bounds on how far the approximate solution is away from the true solution.
A key difference of our approach with existing ones is that our approximation bound is not for theoretical
justification of an approximation algorithm itself, but for practical decision making based on a given approx-
imate solution. Our approximation bound can be obtained without any information about the true solution,
and it can be computed with a reasonable computational cost under secure computation framework, i.e.,
without the risk of disclosing private information.
The proposed SAG method can provide non-probabilistic bounds on a quantity depending on the true
solution of the ERM problem under cryptographically secure computation framework, which is valuable for
making decisions when only an approximate solution is available. In order to develop the SAG method, we
introduce two novel technical contributions in this paper. We first introduce a novel algorithmic framework
for computing approximation guarantee that can be applied to a class of ERM problems whose loss function
is non-linear and its secure evaluation is difficult. In this framework, we use a pair of surrogate loss functions
that bounds the non-linear loss function from below and above. Our second contribution is to implement
these surrogate loss functions by piecewise-linear functions, and show that they can be cryptographically
securely computed. Furthermore, we empirically demonstrate that the bounds obtained by the SAG method
is much tighter than the bounds in Nardi et al.’s method [5] despite the former is non-probabilistic and
assumption-free. Figure 1 is an illustration of the SAG method in a simple logistic regression example.
In machine learning literature, significant amount of works on differential privacy [6] have been recently
studied. The objective of differential privacy is to disclose an information from confidential database without
taking a risk of revealing private information in the database, and random perturbation is main technical
tool for protecting differential privacy. We note that the privacy concern studied in this paper is rather
different from those in differential privacy. Although it would be interesting to study how the latter type
of privacy concerns can be handled with the approach we discussed here, we would focus in this paper on
privacy regarding cryptographically private ML.
Notations We use the following notations in the rest of the paper. We denote the sets of real numbers
and integers as R and Z, respectively. For a natural number N , we define [N ] := {1, 2, . . . , N} and ZN :=
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. The Euclidean norm is written as ‖ · ‖. Indicator function is written as Iχ i.e., Iχ = 1 if
χ is true, and Iχ = 0 otherwise. For a protocol Π between two parties, we use the notation Π(IA, IB) →
(OA,OB), where IA and IB are inputs from the parties A and B, respectively, and OA and OB are outputs
given to A and B, respectively.
3
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 30
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
Logistic function
Approximation by Nardi et al.
(A) A non-linear function 1/(1 + exp(−x)) and
its approximation with [5]
1 2 3 4 50
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Instance ID
Cl
as
sif
ica
tio
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
Truth (not securely computable)
Approximation by Nardi et al.
Secure approximation bound (SAG)
(B) Class probabilities by true and approximate
solutions and the bounds obtained by the SAG
method.
The left plot (A) shows the logistic function (blue) and its approximation (red) proposed in [5]. The right plot
(B) shows the true (blue) and approximate (red) class probabilities of five training instances (the instance
IDs 1, . . . , 5 are shown in the horizontal axis), where the former is obtained with true logistic function, while
the latter is obtained with the approximate logistic function.
The green intervals in plot (B) are the approximation guarantee intervals provided by the SAG method. The
key property of the SAG method is that these intervals are guaranteed to contain the true class probabilities.
Thus they can be used for certainly classifying some of these five instances to either positive or negative
class.
Noting that the lower bounds of the class probabilities are greater than 0.5 in the instances 1 and 4, they would
be certainly classified to positive class. Similarly, noting that the upper bounds of the class probabilities are
smaller than 0.5 in the instances 3 and 5, they would be certainly classified to negative class.
Figure 1: An illustration of the proposed SAG method in a simple logistic regression example
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Problem statement
Empirical risk minimization (ERM) Let {(xi, yi) ∈ X × Y}i∈[n] be the training set, where the input
domain X ⊂ Rd is a compact region in Rd, and the output domain Y is {−1,+1} in classification problems
and R in regression problems. In this paper, we consider the following class of empirical risk minimization
problems:
argmin
w
λ
2
‖w‖2 + 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
`(yi,x
>
i w), (1)
where ` is a loss function subdifferentiable and convex with respect to w, and λ > 0 is the regularization
parameter. L2 regularization in (1) ensures that the solution w is within a compact region W ⊂ Rd.
We consider the cases where ` is hard to compute in secure computation framework, i.e., ` includes
non-linear functions such as log and exp. Popular examples includes logistic regression
`(y,x>w) := log(1 + exp(−x>w))− yx>w, (2)
Poisson regression
`(y,x>w) := exp(x>w)− yx>w, (3)
and exponential regression
`(y,x>w) := (y exp(−x>w))− x>w. (4)
Secure two-party computation We consider secure two-party computation scenario where the training
set {(xi, yi)}i∈[n] is vertically-partitioned between two parties A and B [7], i.e., A and B own different sets
of features for common set of n instances. More precisely, let party A own the first dA features and party B
own the last dB features, i.e., dA + dB = d. We consider a scenario where the labels {yi}i∈[n] are also owned
by either party, and we let party B own them here. We assume that both parties can identify the instance
index i ∈ [n], i.e., it is possible for both parties to make communications with respect to a specified instance.
We denote the input data matrix owned by parties A and B as XA and XB , respectively. Furthermore, we
denote the n-dimensional vector of the labels as y := [y1, . . . , yn]
>.
Semi-honest model In this paper, we develop the SAG method so that it is secure (meaning that private
data is not revealed to the other party) under the semi-honest model [8]. In this security model, any parties
are allowed to guess other party’s data as long as they follow the specified protocol. In other words, we
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assume that all the parties do not modify the specified protocol. The semi-honest model is standard security
model in cryptographically private ML.
2.2 Cryptographically Secure Computation
Paillier cryptosystem For secure computations, we use Paillier cryptosystem [9] as an additive homo-
morphic encryption tool, i.e., we can obtain E(a+ b) from E(a) and E(b) without decryption, where a and b
are plaintexts and E(·) is the encryption function. Paillier cryptosystem has the semantic security [10] (the
IND-CPA security), which roughly means that it is difficult to judge whether a = b or a 6= b by knowing
E(a) and E(b).
Paillier cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem with additive homomorphism over ZN (i.e., modN).
In public key cryptosystem, the private key is two large prime numbers p and q, and the public key is
(N, g) ∈ Z × ZN2 , where N = pq and g is an integer co-prime with N2. Given a plaintext m ∈ ZN , a
ciphertext of E(m) is obtained with a random integer R ∈ ZN as follows:
E(m) = gmRN mod N2.
Ciphertext E(m) is decrypted with the private key whatever R is chosen. With the encryption, the following
additive homomorphism holds for any plaintexts a, b ∈ ZN :
E(a) · E(b) = E(a+ b),
E(a)b = E(ab).
Hereafter, we denote by EpkA(·) and EpkB (·) the encryption functions with the public keys issued by party
A and B, respectively.
Note that we need computations of real numbers rather than integers in data analysis tasks. First,
negative numbers can be treated with the similar technique to the two’s complement. In order to handle
real numbers, we multiply a magnification constant M for each input real number for expressing it with an
integer. Here, there is a tradeoff between the accuracy and range of acceptable real number, i.e., for large
M , accuracy would be high, but only possible to handle a limited range of real numbers.
2.3 Related works
The most general framework for cryptographically private ML is the Yao’s garbled circuit [11], where any
desired secure computation is expressed as an electronic circuit with encrypted components. In principle,
Yao’s garbled circuit can evaluate any function securely, but its computational costs are usually extremely
large. Unfortunately, it is impractical to use Yao’s garbled circuit for secure computations of ERM problems.
Nardi et al. [5] studied cryptographically private approach for logistic regression. As briefly mentioned
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in §1, in order to circumvent the difficulty of secure non-linear function evaluations, the authors proposed
to approximate logistic function by empirical cumulative density function (CDF) of logistic distributions
(see Figure 1(A) as an example). Denoting the true solution and the approximate solution as w∗ and wˆ,
respectively, the authors showed that
‖w∗ − wˆ‖ ≤ nc1 max ‖xi‖
Lγλmin
in probability 1− 2 exp(−cL1−2γ), (5)
where L is the sample size for the empirical CDF, λmin is the smallest eigenvalue of Fisher information matrix
depending on w∗, and c > 0, c1 > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1/2) are constants. This approximation error bound cannot be
used for knowing the approximation quality of the given approximate solution wˆ: the bound depends on the
unknown true solution w∗ because λmin depends on it. Furthermore, in experiment section, we demonstrate
that the SAG method can provide much tighter non-probabilistic bounds than the above probabilistic bound
in Nardi et al.’s method [5].
3 Secure Approximation Guarantee(SAG)
The basic idea behind the SAG method is to introduce two surrogate loss functions φ and ψ that bound the
target non-linear loss function ` from below and above. In what follows, we show that, given an arbitrary
approximate solution wˆ, if we can securely evaluate φ(wˆ), ψ(wˆ) and a subgradient ∂φ/∂w |w=wˆ, we can
securely compute bounds on the true solution w∗ which itself cannot be computed under secure computation
framework.
First, the following theorem states that we can obtain a ball in the solution space in which the true
solution w∗ certainly exists.
Theorem 1. Let φ : R → R and ψ : R → R be functions that satisfy φ(y,x>w) ≤ `(y,x>w) ≤ φ(y,x>w)
∀y ∈ Y,x ∈ X ,w ∈ W, and assume that they are convex and subdifferentiable with respect to w. Then, for
any wˆ ∈ W,
‖w∗ −m(wˆ)‖ ≤ r(wˆ),
i.e., the true solution w∗ is located within a ball in W with the center
m(wˆ) :=
1
2
(
wˆ − 1
λ
∇Φ(wˆ)
)
and the radius
r(wˆ) :=
√∥∥∥∥12
(
wˆ +
1
λ
∇Φ(wˆ)
)∥∥∥∥2 + 1λ (Ψ(wˆ)− Φ(wˆ)),
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where Φ(wˆ) := 1n
∑
i∈[n] φ(yi,x
>
i wˆ), Ψ(wˆ) :=
1
n
∑
i∈[n] ψ(yi,x
>
i wˆ) and ∇Φ(wˆ) is a subgradient of Φ at
w = wˆ.
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix.
Using Theorem 1, we can compute a pair of lower and upper bounds of any linear score in the form of
η>w∗ for an arbitrary η ∈ Rd as the following Corollary states.
Corollary 2. For an arbitrary η ∈ Rd,
LB(η>w∗) ≤ η>w∗ ≤ UB(η>w∗), (6)
where
LB(η>w∗) := η>m(wˆ)− ‖η‖r(wˆ) (7a)
UB(η>w∗) := η>m(wˆ) + ‖η‖r(wˆ). (7b)
The proof of Corollary 2 is presented in Appendix.
Many important quantities in data analyses are represented as a linear score. For example, in binary
classification, the classification result y˜ of a test input x˜ is determined by the sign of the linear score
x˜>w∗. It suggests that we can certainly classify the test instance as LB(x˜>w∗) > 0 ⇒ y˜ = +1 and
UB(x˜>w∗) < 0 ⇒ y˜ = −1. Similarly, if we are interested in each coefficient w∗h, h ∈ [d], of the trained
model, by setting η = eh where eh is a d-dimensional vector of all 1s except 0 in the h-th component, we
can obtain a pair of lower and upper bounds on the coefficient as LB(e>hw
∗) ≤ w∗h ≤ UB(e>hw∗).
We note that Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 are inspired by recent works on safe screening and related
problems [12–19], where an approximate solution is used for bounding the optimal solution without solving
the optimization problem.
4 SAG implementation with piecewise-linear functions
In this section, we present how to compute the bounds on the true solution discussed in §3 under secure
computation framework. Specifically, we propose using piecewise-linear functions for the two surrogate loss
functions φ and ψ. In §4.1, we present a protocol of secure piecewise-linear function evaluation (SPL). In
§4.2, we describe a protocol for securely computing the bounds. In the appendix, we describe a specific
implementation for logistic regression.
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Figure 2: An example of bounding convex function of one variable log(1 + exp(−s)) with piecewise linear
functions with K sections for s ∈ [−10, 10]
4.1 Secure piecewise-linear function computation
Let us denote a piecewise-linear function with K pieces defined in s ∈ [T0, TK ] as
g(s) = (αjs+ βj)ITj−1≤s<Tj , (8)
where {(αj , βj)}j∈[K] are the coefficients of the j-th linear segment and T0 < T1 < . . . < TK−1 < TK are
breakpoints. For continuity, we assume that αjTj + βj = αj+1Tj + βj+1 for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}.
An advantage of piecewise-linear functions is that, for any one-dimensional convex function, a lower
bounding function can be easily obtained by using its tangents, while an upper bounding function can be
also easily obtained by using its chords. In addition, we can easily control the trade-off between the accuracy
and the computational complexity by changing the number of pieces K. Figure 2 shows examples of two
piecewise-linear surrogate loss functions for a non-linear function log(1 + exp(−s)) for several values of K.
The following theorem states that a piecewise-linear function g(s) can be securely evaluated.
Theorem 3. Suppose that party A has EpkB (sA) and party B has EpkA(sB) such that s = sA + sB. Then,
the two parties can securely evaluate the encrypted value of the piecewise-linear function value g(s) in the
sense that there is a secure protocol that outputs EpkB (gA) and EpkA(gB) respectively to party A and party
B such that gA + gB = g(s).
The proof of Theorem 3 is presented in Appendix. In the proof, we develop such a protocol called SPL,
whose input-output property is represented as
SPL(EpkB (sA), EpkA(sB)) → (EpkB (gA), EpkA(gB)).
Let oj(s) := Is∈[Tj−1,Tj), j ∈ [K], denote the indicator of an event that a scalar s is in the j-th piece.
The difficulty of secure piecewise-linear function evaluation is that we need to securely compute E(oj(s)).
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We use a protocol presented by Veugen et al. [20] in order to compute E(Ia<b) from E(a) and E(b), and
then compute E(oj(s)) as
E(oj(s)) = E(Is≥Tj−1 − Is≥Tj ) = E(Is≥Tj−1)E(Is≥Tj )−1.
Using the indicators {oj(s)}j∈[K], the piecewise-linear function value g(s) is written as
g(s) =
∑
j∈[K]
oj(s)(αjs+ βj), (9)
which can be securely computed if E(oj(s)) and E(s) are available.
We finally note that, in Theorem 1, when φ(s) is represented as a piecewise-linear function, its subderiva-
tive ∂φ(s)/∂s is represented as a piecewise-constant function and so is the subgradient ∇Φ(wˆ). We can
develop a secure piecewise-constant function evaluation protocol based on the same idea as above (detailed
in the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix).
4.2 Secure bound computation
We describe here how to compute the bounds on the true solution in the form of (6) when the surrogate loss
functions φ and ψ are implemented with piecewise-linear functions. We consider a class of loss functions `
that can be decomposed as
`(y,x>w) = u(s(y,x>w)) + v(y,x>w), (10)
where u is a non-linear function whose secure evaluation is difficult, while s(y,x>w), v(y,x>w), and their
subgradients are assumed to be securely evaluated. Note that most commonly-used loss functions can
be written in this form. For example, in the case of logistic regression (2), u(s) = log(1 + exp(−s)),
s(y,x>w) = x>w and v(y,x>w) = −yx>w.
We consider a situation that two parties A and B own encrypted approximate solution wˆ separately for
their own features, i.e., parties A and B own EpkB (wˆA) and EpkA(wˆB), respectively, where wˆA and wˆB the
first dA and the following dB components of wˆ.
4.2.1 Secure computations of the ball
The following theorem states that the center m(wˆ) and the radius r(wˆ) can be securely computed.
Theorem 4. Suppose that party A has XA and EpkB (wˆA), while party B has XB, y and EpkA(wˆB). Then,
the two parties can securely compute the center m(wˆ) and the radius r(wˆ) in the sense that there is a secure
protocol that outputs EpkB (mA(wˆ)) and EpkB (rA(wˆ)
2) to party A, and EpkA(mB(wˆ)) and EpkA(rB(wˆ)
2)
to party B such that mA(wˆ) +mB(wˆ) = m(wˆ) and rA(wˆ)
2 + rB(wˆ)
2 = r(wˆ)2.
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We call such a protocol as secure ball computation (SBC) protocol. whose input-output property is
characterized as
SBC((XA, EpkB (wˆA)), (XB ,y, EpkA(wˆB))
→ ((EpkB (mA(wˆ)), EpkB (rA(wˆ)2)), (EpkA(mB(wˆ)), EpkA(rB(wˆ)2)))
To prove Theorem 4, we only describe secure computations of three components in the SBC protocol. We
omit the security analysis of the other components because they can be easily derived from the security
properties of Paillier cryptosystem [9], comparison protocol [20] and multiplication protocol [21]. 1
Encrypted values of Ψ(wˆ)−Φ(wˆ) This quantity can be obtained by summing ψ(xi)−φ(xi) for i ∈ [n].
Denoting φ := u(s) + v and ψ := u(s) + v, where u and u are lower and upper bounds of u implemented
with piecewise-linear functions, respectively, we can compute ψ(xi)− φ(xi) = u− u by using SPL protocol
for each of u and u.
Encrypted values of ∇Φ(wˆ) This quantity can be obtained by summing ∇φ at w = wˆ. Since ∇φ =
∂
∂wu(s) +
∂v
∂w = u
′(s) ∂s∂w +
∂v
∂w , its encrypted version can be written as E(∇φ) = E(u′(s) ∂s∂w )E( ∂v∂w ). Here,
u′(s) can be securely evaluated because u′ is piecewise-constant function, while ∂s∂w and
∂v
∂w are securely
computed from the assumption in (10). For computing E(u′(s) ∂s∂w ) from E(u
′(s)) and E( ∂s∂w ), we can use
the secure multiplication protocol in [21].
Encrypted value of r(wˆ)2 In order to compute this quantity, we need the encrypted value of ‖ 12 (wˆ +
1/λ∇Φ)‖2, which can be also computed by using the secure multiplication protocol in [21].
4.2.2 Secure computations of the bounds
Finally we discuss here how to securely compute the upper and the lower bounds in (6) from the encrypted
m(wˆ) and r(wˆ)2. The protocol depends on who owns the test instance and who receives the resulted bounds.
We describe here a protocol for a particular setup where the test instance x˜ is owned by two parties A and
B, i.e., x˜ = [x˜>A x˜
>
B ]
> where x˜A and x˜B are the first dA and the following dB components of x˜, and that the
lower and the upper bounds are given to either party. Similar protocols can be easily developed for other
setups.
Theorem 5. Let party A owns x˜A, EpkB (mA(wˆ)) and EpkB (rA(wˆ)
2), and party B owns x˜B, EpkA(mB(wˆ))
and EpkA(rB(wˆ)
2), respectively. Then, either party A or B can receive the lower and the upper bounds of
x˜>w∗ in the form of (6) without revealing x˜A and x˜B to the others.
1We add that the trade-off of security strengths and computation times of Paillier cryptosystem and the comparison protocol
are controlled by parameters (N in §2.2 for Paillier cryptosystem; another parameter exists for the comparison protocol). Thus
the total security depends on the weaker one of the two. The security of the multiplication protocol depends on the security of
Paillier cryptosystem itself.
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Table 1: Data sets used for the logistic regression. All are from UCI Machine Learning Repository.
data set training set validation set d
Musk 3298 3300 166
MGT 9510 9510 10
Spambase 2301 2301 57
OLD 1268 1268 72
The proof of Theorem 5 is presented in Appendix. We note that a party who receives bounds from the pro-
tocol would get some information about the center mB(wˆ) and the radius rB(wˆ), but no other information
about the original dataset is revealed.
5 Experiments
We conducted experiments for illustrating the performances of the proposed SAG method. The experimental
setup is as follows. We used Paillier cryptosystem with N = 1024-bit public key and comparison protocol by
Veugen et al. [20] for 60 bits of integers. The program is implemented with Java, and the communications
between two parties are implemented with sockets between two processes working in the same computer. We
used a single computer with 3.07GHz Xeon CPU and 48GB RAM. Except when we investigate computational
costs, computations were done on unencrypted values. Note that the proposed SAG method provide bounds
on the true solution w∗ based on an arbitrary approximate solution wˆ. In all the experiments presented
here, we used approximate solutions obtained by Nardi et al.’s approach [5] as the approximate solution wˆ.
In what follows, we call the bounds or intervals obtained by the SAG method as SAG bounds and SAG
intervals, respectively.
5.1 Logistic regression
We first investigated several properties of the SAG method for the logistic regression (2) by applying it to
four benchmark datasets summarized in Table 1.
First, in Figure 3, we compared the tightness of the bounds on the predicted classification probabilities
for two randomly chosen validation instances xi defined as p(xi) := 1/(1 + exp(−x>i w∗)), i = 1, 2. In the
figure, four types of intervals are plotted. The orange ones are Nardi et al.’s probabilistic bounds [5] with
the probability 90% (see (5)). The blue, green and purple ones were obtained by the SAG method with
K = 100, 1000 and ∞, respectively, where K is the number of pieces in the piecewise-linear approximations.
Here, K =∞ means that the true loss function ` was used as the two surrogate loss functions φ and ψ. The
results clearly indicate that bounds obtained by the SAG method are clearly tighter than those by Nardi et
al.’s approach despite that the latter is probabilistic and cannot be securely computed in practice. When
comparing the results with different K, we can confirm that large K yields tighter bounds. The results with
K = 1000 are almost as tight as those obtained with the true loss function (K =∞).
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Figure 3: The result of proposed bounds for some test instances
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Figure 4: Change of bounds for the change of the accuracy of the approximated solution wˆ
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Figure 5: Rate of successfully classified test instances and the average of size of bounds by different bound
calculations (Nardi’s, K ∈ {100, 200, 500, 1000,∞})
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Table 2: Computation Time for obtaining bounds per instance
K 100 200 500 1000
Time(s) 381.089 790.674 1877.176 3717.569
Figure 4 also shows similar plots. Here, we investigated how the tightness of the SAG bounds changes
with the quality of the approximate solution wˆ. In order to consider approximate solutions with different
levels of quality, we computed three approximate solutions with L = 10, 100 and 1000 in Nardi et al.’s
approach, where L is the sample size used for approximating the logistic function (see §2.3). The results
clearly indicate that tighter bounds are obtained when the quality of the approximate solution is higher (i.e.,
larger L).
Figure 5 illustrates how the SAG bounds can be useful in binary classification problems. In binary
classification problems, if a lower bound of the classification probability is greater than 0.5, the instance
would be classified to positive class. Similarly, if an upper bound of the classification probability is smaller
than 0.5, the instance would be classified to negative class. The green histograms in the figure indicate how
many percent of the validation instances can be certainly classified as positive or negative class based on the
SAG bounds. The blue lines indicate the average length of the SAG intervals, i.e., the difference between the
upper and the lower bounds. The results clearly indicate that, as the number of pieces K increases in the
SAG method, the tighter bounds are obtained, and more validation instances can be certainly classified. On
the other hand, probabilistic bounds in Nardi et al.’s approach cannot provide certain classification results
because their bounds are too loose.
Finally, we examined the computation time for computing the SAG bounds. Table 2 shows the compu-
tation time per instance with K = {100, 200, 500, 1000}. The results suggest that the computational cost is
almost linear in K, meaning that the computation of piecewise-linear functions dominates the cost. Although
this task can be completely parallelized per instance, further speed-up would be desired when K is larger
than 1000.
5.2 Poisson and exponential regressions
We applied the SAG method to Poisson regression (3) and exponential regression (4). Poisson regression was
applied to a problem for predicting the number of produced seeds 2. Exponential regression was applied to
a problem for predicting survival time of lung cancer patients 3. The results are shown in Figure 6. The left
plot (A) shows the result of Poisson regression, where the SAG intervals on the predicted number of seeds are
plotted for several randomly chosen instances. The right plot (B) shows the SAG bounds on the predicted
survival probability curve, in which we can confirm that the true survival probability curve is included in
the SAG bound.
2http://hosho.ees.hokudai.ac.jp/˜kubo/stat/2015/Fig/poisson/data3a.csv
3http://help.xlstat.com/customer/portal/kb article attachments/60040/original.xls
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Figure 6: Proposed bounds for Poisson and exponential regressions
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Figure 7: Bounds of coefficients for disease risk evaluation
5.3 Privacy-preserving logistic regression to genomic and clinical data analysis
Finally, we apply the SAG method to a logistic regression on a genomic and clinical data analysis, which
is the main motivation of this work (§1). In this problem, we are interested in modeling the risk of a
disease based on genomic and clinical information of potential patients. The difficulty of this problem is
that genomic information were collected in a research institute, while clinical information were collected in a
hospital, and both institutes do not want to share their data to others. However, since the risk of the disease
is dependent both on genomic and clinical features, it is quite valuable to use both types of information for
the risk modeling. Our goal is to find genomic and clinical features that highly affect the risk of the disease.
To this end, we use the SAG method for computing the bounds of coefficients of the logistic regression model
as described in §3.
In this experiment, 13 genomic (SNP) and 10 clinical features of 134 potential patients are provided
from a research institute and a hospital, respectively 4. The SAG bounds on each of these 23 coefficients are
plotted in Figure 7. Although we do not know the true coefficient values, we can at least identify features that
positively/negatively correlated with the disease risk (note that, if the lower/upper bound is greater/smaller
than 0, the feature is guaranteed to have positive/negative coefficient in the logistic regression model).
4Due to confidentiality reasons, we cannot describe the details of the dataset. Here, we only analyzed a randomly sampled
small portion of the datasets just for illustration purpose.
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6 Conclusions
We studied empirical risk minimization (ERM) problems under secure multi-party computation (MPC)
frameworks. We developed a novel technique called secure approximation guarantee (SAG) method that can
be used when only an approximate solution is available due to the difficulty of secure non-linear function
evaluations. The key property of the SAG method is that it can securely provide the bounds on the true
solution, which is practically valuable as we illustrated in benchmark data experiments and in our motivating
problem on genomic and clinical data.
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Appendix
Proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 (bounds of w∗ from wˆ)
First we present the following proposition which will be used for proving Theorem 1.
Proposition 6. Consider the following general problem:
min
z
g(z) s.t. z ∈ Z, (11)
where g : Z → R is a subdifferentiable convex function and Z is a convex set. Then a solution z∗ is the
optimal solution of (11) if and only if
∇g(z∗)>(z∗ − z) ≤ 0 ∀ z ∈ Z,
where ∇g(z∗) is the subgradient vector of g at z = z∗.
See, for example, Proposition B.24 in [22] for the proof of Proposition 6.
Proof of Theorem 1. Using a slack variable ξ ∈ R, let us first rewrite the minimization problem (1) as
min
w∈Rd,ξ∈R
J(w, ξ) := ξ +
λ
2
‖w‖2 s.t. ξ ≥ 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
`(yi,x
>
i w). (12)
Note that the optimal solution of the problem (12) is w = w∗ and ξ = ξ∗ := 1n
∑
i∈[n] `(yi,x
>
i w
∗). Using
the definitions of ψ and Ψ, we have 1n
∑
i∈[n] `(yi,x
>
i wˆ) ≤ 1n
∑
i∈[n] ψ(yi,x
>
i wˆ) = Ψ(wˆ). It means that
(wˆ,Ψ(wˆ)) is a feasible solution of the problem (12). Applying this fact into Proposition 6, we have
∇J(w∗, ξ∗)>
 w∗
ξ∗
−
 wˆ
Ψ(wˆ)
 ≤ 0, (13)
where ∇J(w∗, ξ∗) ∈ Rd+1 is the gradient of the objective function in (12) evaluated at (w∗, ξ∗). Since
J(w, ξ) is a quadratic function of w and ξ, we can write ∇J(w∗, ξ∗) explicitly, and (13) is written as
λ‖w2‖+ ξ∗ − λw∗>wˆ −Ψ(wˆ) ≤ 0
⇔ λ‖w∗2‖+ 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
`(yi,x
>
i w
∗)− λw∗>wˆ −Ψ(wˆ) ≤ 0 (14)
From the definition of φ and Φ, we have
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
`(yi,x
>
i w
∗) ≥ 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
φ(yi,x
>
i w
∗) = Φ(w∗).
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Plugging this into (14), we have
λ‖w∗2‖+ Φ(w∗)− λw∗>wˆ −Ψ(wˆ) ≤ 0 (15)
Furthermore, noting that φ and Φ are convex with respect to w, by the definition of convex functions we get
Φ(w∗) ≥ Φ(wˆ) +∇Φ(wˆ)>(w∗ − wˆ). (16)
By plugging (16) into (15),
λ‖w∗2‖+ Φ(wˆ) +∇Φ(wˆ)>(w∗ − wˆ)− λw∗>wˆ −Ψ(wˆ) ≤ 0 (17)
Noting that (17) is a quadratic function of w∗, we obtain
∥∥∥∥w∗ − 12
(
wˆ − 1
λ
∇Φ(wˆ)
)∥∥∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥∥∥12
(
wˆ +
1
λ
∇Φ(wˆ)
)∥∥∥∥2 + 1λ (Ψ(wˆ)− Φ(wˆ)) .
It means that the optimal solution w∗ is within a ball with the center m(wˆ) and the radius r(wˆ), which
completes the proof. 
Next, we prove Corollary 2.
Proof of Corollary 2. We show that the lower bound of the linear model output value w∗>x is x>m(wˆ)−
‖x‖r(wˆ) under the constraint that
‖w∗ −m(wˆ)‖ ≤ r(wˆ).
To formulate this, let us consider the following constrained optimization problem
min
w∈Rd
w>x s.t. ‖w −m(wˆ)‖2 ≤ r(wˆ)2. (18)
Using a Lagrange multiplier µ > 0, the problem (18) is rewritten as
min
w∈Rd
w>x s.t. ‖w −m(wˆ)‖2 ≤ r(wˆ)2,
= min
w∈Rd
max
µ>0
(
w>x+ µ(‖w −m(wˆ)‖2 − r(wˆ)2))
= max
µ>0
(− µr(wˆ)2 + min
w
(
µ‖w −m(wˆ)‖2 +w>x))
= max
µ>0
H(µ) :=
(− µr(wˆ)2 − ‖x‖2
4µ
+ x>m(wˆ)
)
,
where µ is strictly positive because the constraint ‖w −m(wˆ)‖2 ≤ r(wˆ)2 is strictly active at the optimal
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solution. By letting ∂H(µ)/∂µ = 0, the optimal µ is written as
µ∗ :=
‖x‖
2r(wˆ)
= arg max
µ>0
H(µ).
Substituting µ∗ into H(µ),
x>m(wˆ)− ‖x‖r(wˆ) = max
µ>0
H(µ).
The upper bound part can be shown similarly. 
Proof of Theorem 3 (Protocol evaluating piecewise linear function and its sub-
derivative securely)
First we explain the outline of the protocol of secure comparison by Veugen et al. [20]. The protocol returns
the result of comparison EpkB (Iq>0) (given to party A) for the encrypted values EpkB (q) (owned by party
A) with the following two steps:
• Party A and B obtain qA := R and qB := q +R, respectively, where R is a random value, and
• Party A and B compare qA and qB with the implementation of bit-wise comparison with Paillier
cryptosystem (see the original paper).
Let us denote the protocol of the latter by SC(qA, qB) → (EpkB (IqA>qB ), EpkA(IqA>qB )), that is, SC is a
protocol comparing two private, unencrypted values owned by two parties qA, qB .
The protocol for Theorem 3 is as follows:
1. Party A computes EpkB (s) = EpkB (sA + sB) from EpkB (sA) and EpkA(sB) as follows:
• Party B generates a random value R ∈ ZN/2 (N is defined in §2.2), then sends EpkA(sB − R) =
EpkA(sB)
−R and EpkB (R) to party A.
• Party A decrypts EpkA(sB − R) and computes EpkB (sA + sB) as: EpkB (sA + sB) = EpkB (sA +
sB −R+R) = EpkB (sA + sB −R)EpkB (R) = EpkB (sA)sB−REpkB (R).
See [23] for the security of the part.
2. With the similar protocol to Veugen et al.’s, party A and B obtains pA and pB , respectively, where pA
and pB are randomized and satisfy pA + pB = s.
3. Compute tj = IpA+pB>Tj securely with SC:
SC(pA, Tj − pB)→ (EpkB (tj), EpkA(tj)), (19)
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Figure 8: Computing oj from tj in the protocol SPLC
4. Party A computes EpkB (oj) from EpkB (tj):
EpkB (oj) = EpkB (tj−1 − tj) = EpkB (tj−1) · EpkB (tj)−1
Party B similarly computes for EpkA . The idea is shown in Figure 8.
5. Party A computes gAj := αjpA + βj , and party B gBj := αjpB for all j ∈ [K]. Note that gAj + gBj =
αjs+ βj .
6. Compute encrypted gA and gB . Because gA + gB = g(s) after taking gA =
∑
j∈[K] ojgAj and gB =∑
j∈[K] ojgBj (see (9) in §4), party A computes EpkB (gA) as
EpkB (gA) = EpkB
∑
j∈[K]
ojgAj
 = ∏
j∈[K]
EpkB (oj)
gAj .
Party B similarly computes EpkA(gB).
To obtain the subderivative g′(s) =
∑
j∈[K] ojαj , during the protocol for Theorem 3, party A computes
EpkB (g
′(s)) as
EpkB (g
′(s)) = EpkB
∑
j∈[K]
ojαj
 = ∏
j∈[K]
EpkB (oj)
αj .
Party B similarly computes EpkA(g
′(s)).
Proof of Theorem 5 (Protocol evaluating the upper and the lower bounds)
Protocol 1 securely evaluates the upper bound UB and the lower bound LB, where sqrt is an upper bound
of the square root function implemented as a piecewise linear function. Note that taking r larger does not
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Protocol 1: Protocol for bound computation
public sqrt
Input of A EpkB (mA), EpkB (r
2
A), x˜A
Input of B EpkB (mB), EpkB (r
2
B), x˜B
Output of A UB,LB
Output of B ∅
Step 1. Party A and B computes:
party A:EpkB (x˜
>
AmA), EpkA(‖x˜A‖2)
party B:EpkA(x˜
>
AmB), ‖x˜B‖2
step 2. Party A sends EpkB (x˜
>
AmA), EpkA(‖x˜A‖2), EpkB (r2A) to B.
Party B obtains EpkA(x˜
>m), EpkA(‖x˜‖2), EpkA(r2).
// The similar manner to the protocol for Theorem 3, step 1
step 2. Compute EpkB (‖x˜‖2r2) using the protocol for multiplication in [21].
step 3. Compute ‖x˜‖r with SPL:
SPL(EpkB (0), EpkB (‖x˜‖2r2))→ (qA, qB) //qA + qB = ‖x˜‖r
step 4. Party A sends EpkB (qB) to B.
Party B obtains qB and thus EpkA(‖x˜‖r) = EpkA(qA)qB .
Party B computes the followings and sends to A.
EpkA(UB)← EpkA(x˜>m+ ‖x˜‖r)
EpkA(LB)← EpkA(x˜>m− ‖x˜‖r)
step 5. Party A obtains UB,LB by decrypting them.
lose the validity of the bounds (looser bounds are obtained) as
x˜>m− ‖x˜‖r ≤ x˜>m− ‖x˜‖r,
x˜>m+ ‖x˜‖r ≥ x˜>m+ ‖x˜‖r.
The security is proved as follows: all techniques used in the protocol are secure with the same discussions
as previous. The remaining problem is that whether party A can guess x˜B from UB and LB. Party A can
know UB + LB = x˜>m = x˜>AmA + x˜
>
BmB and UB − LB = ‖x˜‖r = sqrt((‖x˜A‖2 + ‖x˜B‖2)(r2A + r2B)).
However, because party A does not know mA, mB , r
2
A or r
2
B , party A cannot guess x˜B either
5.
Example Protocol for the Logistic Regression
We show the detailed implementation of secure ball computation (SBC, Theorem 4) in §4 for the logistic
regression, including how to use the secure computation of piecewise linear functions (SPL, Theorem 3).
5If this protocol is conducted for many enough x˜, because party A knows x˜A, party A can also know mA by solving a
system of linear equations, and thus know x˜>BmB . This, however, does not lead party A to guess separate x˜B or mB because
they are both private for party B.
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For the logistic regression (§2.1), Y = {−1,+1}, and we take u(s) = log(1 + exp(−s)), s = x>w and
v(y,x>w) = −yx>w in Theorem 4.
To apply this for SPL, we set EpkB (sA) := EpkB (x
>
AwˆA) and EpkA(sB) := EpkA(x
>
BwˆB) since we assume
party A and B knows EpkB (wˆA) and EpkA(wˆB), respectively. Note that sA + sB = s because x = [x
>
A x
>
B ]
>
and w = [w>A w
>
B ]
>. Take piecewise linear functions u(s) and u(s) as lower and upper bounds of u(s),
respectively. With it, we can compute φ, ψ and ∇φ in SAG as follows:
ψ|w=wˆ−φ|w=wˆ = u(x>wˆ)− u(x>wˆ),
∇φ|w=wˆ = u′(x>wˆ) ∂s
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wˆ
+
∂v
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wˆ
= u′(x>wˆ)
∂
∂w
x>w
∣∣∣∣
w=wˆ
+
∂
∂w
yx>w
∣∣∣∣
w=wˆ
= (u′(x>wˆ) + y)x,
which are all computable with SPL.
After these preparations, we can conduct the protocol SBC as Protocol 2.
Remark 7. In the description of the protocol, we omitted the maginification constant M (§2.2) for simplicity.
We have to notice that, summing two values magnified by Ma and M b, we get a value magnified by Mmax{a,b}.
Similarly, multiplying two values magnified by Ma and M b, we get a value magnified by Ma+b. In the
protocol, when the original data is magnified by M , then the final result is magnified by M12. So we have to
adjust M so that M12 times the final result does not exceed the domain of Paillier cryptosystem ZN .
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Protocol 2: Secure Ball Computation protocol (SBC)
Public φ := u(s)− yx>w, ψ := u(s)− yx>w
Input from A {xiA}i∈[n], EpkB (wˆA)
Input from B {xiB , yi}i∈[n], EpkA(wˆB)
Output to A EpkB (mA), EpkB (r
2
A)
Output to B EpkA(mB), EpkA(r
2
B) (where r
2
A + r
2
B = r
2)
Step1 Party B sends EpkB (y) to party A.
Step2 Party A and B compute encrypted Φ, Ψ and ∇Φ at w = wˆ.
Party A does:
for i = 1 to n:
SPLC(EpkB (x
>
iAwˆA), EpkA(x
>
iBwˆB))→ (EpkB (u∗iA), EpkA(u∗iB)),
SPLC(EpkB (x
>
iAwˆA), EpkA(x
>
iBwˆB))→ (EpkB (u∗iA), EpkA(u∗iB))
// Note: E(a)1/n is in reality computed as E(a)M/n,
// where M is the magnification constant.
// Note: E(a)η (η: a vector) means [E(a)η1 E(a)η2 · · · ]>.
EpkB (ΨA − ΦA)
← EpkB
(
1
n
∑
i∈[n][u
∗
iA − yix>iAwˆA]− 1n
∑
i∈[n][u
∗
iA − yix>iAwˆA]
)
= EpkB
(
1
n
∑
i∈[n][u
∗
iA − u∗iA]
)
=
[∏
i∈[n]EpkB (u
∗
iA)
]1/n [∏
i∈[n]EpkB (u
∗
iA)
]−1/n
// ΦA + ΦB = Ψ, ΨA + ΨB = Ψ
EpkB (∇ΦA)← EpkB
(
1
n
∑
i∈[n][u
′(x>i w)− yi]xiA
)
=
[∏
i∈[n]EpkB (u
′(x>i w))EpkB (yi)
−1
](1/n)xiA
// [∇Φ>A,∇Φ>B ]> = ∇Φ
// Note: αj and oj means αj and oj for u
// (see the subderivative computation in Theorem 3).
Party B does the similar.
Step3 Party A and B compute encrypted m and r.
Party A does:
EpkB (mA)← EpkB (wˆA − 1λ∇ΦA)1/2
Compute EpkB (‖ 12 (wˆA+ 1λ∇ΦA)‖2) from EpkB ( 12 (wˆA+ 1λ∇ΦA)) = [EpkB (wˆA)EpkB (∇ΦA)1/λ]1/2
using the multiplication protocol in [21].
EpkB (r
2
A)← EpkB (‖ 12 (wˆA + 1λ∇ΦA)‖2) · (EpkB (ΨA) · EpkB (ΦA)−1)1/λ
Party B does the similar.
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